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Thank you Vice Chancellor; good evening ladies and gentleman. 
 
Are we facing the end of our own and our governments’ capacities to shape the spread of the 
Internet and its influence on our lives?  Innumerable technologists, academics and policy 
makers will tell you that we are.  This evening I will convince you that we are not, at least not 
necessarily.  
 
Information and communication technologies, including the Internet and a multitude of 
services, are much discussed topics these days.  We hear from the press, the Prime Minister, 
and many scholars that we, and the next generation, must acquire new skills if we want to 
participate in something that has come to be called the knowledge-based economy.  There is 
no consensus about what this term means.  I think probably we could agree, nevertheless, that 
something is in the air.  Something is happening in our economies that is worth paying 
attention to.  We also most likely could agree that, like it or not, the new digital technologies 
are becoming essential for many kinds of highly valued work and they are increasingly highly 
valued for education, entertainment and a growing number of other applications.  We hear 
very little, however, about who, with the exception of Microsoft’s Bill Gates, can or should 
control, or influence, our individual and collective future in an economy where these 
technologies are playing an ever greater role.   
 
Here is a technologist’s viewpoint.  Professor Peter Cochrane is Chief Technologist at BT’s 
laboratory in Martelsham.  His view is this, and I quote, ‘digital television is exciting, not 
because the picture is better, but because it is going to be a point of transaction.  Most people 
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will never master the perverted interface of the PC, but they will be able to control the 
television set.  Government, however, does not have a hope in hell of controlling any of this.  
[The digital economy] is devoid of shape, form, edges, and geography’.1  Professor 
Cochrane’s principal point in this speech was that chaos is the natural mode of organisation.   
 
This is a man who has the ear of politicians in Whitehall and in Brussels.  This is one of the 
self-proclaimed visionaries who occupy prominent posts in private R&D facilities that are 
devoting millions to designing new technologies and services.  Professor Cochrane seems to 
believe that public intervention and governance in the Information Age is obsolete; it cannot 
work because innovation is a chaotic process.  In his world-view, the major transformations 
in the economy and society, the new electronic commerce businesses, new public and private 
information services, and more people working and learning on-line – are best understood as 
emerging from inevitable and naturally chaotic processes of uncontrolled change. 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
What does science and technology policy research indicate about this viewpoint? Our 
research in SPRU demands that we challenge this argument.  I do not contend that we have 
incontrovertible evidence that Professor Cochrane is wrong. I do suggest that what he says 
reflects an all too familiar ‘habit of thought’.  This is the view that technological change and 
market evolution have a ‘natural’ course of development.  This widely held belief is 
repudiated, however, by careful observation of the cumulative effects of innovations in 
technologies and in our institutions of governance, in recent and historical times.  Professor 
Cochrane engages in ‘millennial thought’; he holds the view that history, and all the 
continuities it implies, have ended, or are about to end.  If this is so, I prefer evidence over 
rhetoric.  He joins those who believe that economies operate with little or no reference to the 
legal and political processes in which they are embedded.  This too requires evidence.  Adam 
Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is firmly connected to the laws and conventions that make it possible 
for markets to operate. 
 
The knowledge-based economy, or as the DTI calls it, the knowledge-driven economy, are 
labels used to capture a qualitative distinction in the organisation and conduct of modern life.  
In this kind of economy, the success of enterprises, and of nation states, is believed to rely 
upon how effective they are in generating and using knowledge. If we adopt Professor 
Cochrane’s view, we need only clear the path for the new technologies and then sit back and 
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enjoy the ride.   
 
But another ‘habit of thought’ suggests that we act in a different way.  The quality of the 
emerging economy will depend upon active involvement with, and commitment to, 
modifying our economic, legal and technological systems.  If such changes are to be to our 
advantage, it is imperative that we consider, systematically, how the new digital technologies 
are interacting with our institutions.  
 
We need innovation, not only in technology, but also in how we comprehend and influence 
technological change.  Rather than facing the ‘end of control’, we face new and subtle means 
of control with ambiguous implications for our social and economic welfare.  Without 
informed policy action, based on better evidence about these developments, there is a good 
chance that chaotic outcomes will predominate in our everyday lives. As implausible as it 
may seem to you, we are engaged collectively in creating the new technological tools.  We 
have far greater power to influence their development than commonly is appreciated.   
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
To convince you that this is so, my method this evening is to introduce you to what I call the 
digital wall.  I am going to show you that this wall is moving and that this movement raises 
major issues for policy and for wider concerns about governance.  First, however, we do need 
to identify the digital wall. 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
To help me with this I am going to build on a metaphor created by another leading 
technologist.  Dr. John Taylor, formerly Director of Hewlett Packard Labs UK, is now 
Director General of the Research Councils.  Dr. Taylor draws a distinction between the 
technology systems ‘behind the wall’ and those ‘in front of the wall’.2   
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
The systems in front of the digital wall are the ones we use at work and at home.  They are 
the world wide web browsers, the PC banking services, and the software for word processing, 
for electronic mail, and for doing sums.  We engage with technologies in front of the wall 
when we connect to networks delivering broadcasts using our televisions and when we 
connect to one another using our fixed and mobile telephones.  It is often argued that these 
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are all converging towards a virtual ‘looking glass’ world that some people call ‘cyberspace’. 
 
The technologies behind the wall make cyberspace possible.  They are built by software 
developers and technicians who design the new systems.  They are being developed by 
entrepreneurs who are defining the services that are used to gain entry to cyberspace.  These 
systems affect how you can use the technologies in front of the wall, what you need to know 
in order to use them, and who you must pay for their use.  With a few exceptions - mostly 
young men who like to hack into computer systems and the Internet - the technological 
system behind the digital wall is not readily understood or subject to control by most users. 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
And, in addition, this digital wall is moving.  Let me illustrate how.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
Innovations in these technologies are providing a basis for ‘appliance to appliance’ 
communication and information exchange.  This is a radical change, and it impinges upon our 
lives in subtle ways.  For instance, when we sit in our cars - assuming, of course, we can 
afford a relatively new car - a cluster of computers elects whether to deploy protective 
airbags and when to augment our control of the braking system.  Tomorrow, our appliances 
will communicate with one another about our habits, sometimes with our knowledge and 
sometimes not.  It will be necessary to learn how to modify the decisions these appliances 
make on our behalf.   
 
The idea being promoted by many engineers and Internet-based companies is that the 
technological system in front, and behind the wall is neutral with respect to our social 
experiences and economic prospects.  As users, all we need to be concerned about is our 
capacity to select which appliances we want to use to interact with government, to be 
entertained and to learn, and to achieve gains in productivity for firms.  From this standpoint, 
we need not be concerned about the systems behind the digital wall which we use to access 
cyberspace. Nor do we need to be concerned about the consequences of the fact that the 
digital wall is moving. It is moving because the systems behind the wall are making a 
substantially greater number of decisions on our behalf.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
Should we leave what goes on behind this wall to the technologists?  Even if we understand 
that the choices about what goes on behind this wall matter in our lives, how can we 
influence them?  Most of us will never be in a position to second guess the computerised 
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choices that are being made on our behalf.  Nor could we, in any meaningful sense, vote on 
the options even if we had the opportunity. 
 
What is my argument then?  It is that we can exercise some control over these choices by 
shaping the institutions that govern the deployment and use of the new technologies.  Rather 
than accepting that technological change is neutral, we should expect that it is not.  We need 
to investigate how it favours specific outcomes that perpetuate historical patterns of economic 
growth and social development, and, of course, how it favours departures.  Precisely because 
of the scope and uneven spread of the new technologies, these outcomes are more important 
than is knowing what our appliances are saying about us behind our backs.  These outcomes 
influence who we communicate with.  They influence how we select and value information.  
They affect whether we can turn information into productive knowledge.  These outcomes are 
increasingly setting the terms under which you, and your children, access education 
resources, health information, or earn a livelihood.  They are affecting our hopes for the 
future and they are determining who owns the machinery for wealth generation in this 
century. 
 
You may be thinking that exercising control over these outcomes must involve a kind of 
expertise that only a very few of us can ever achieve.  My experience suggests otherwise, 
however.  There always have been people who devote themselves to understanding what goes 
on both in front and behind my metaphorical digital wall.  It is possible to translate this 
understanding into clear policy options and issues for debate. I have not always believed that 
this is so.  Let me explain how I arrived at this view by reflecting for a few moments on my 
own intellectual trajectory.  After that we will return to our discussion about the digital wall. 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
My career has been characterised - those of you who know me well may say over-determined 
- by a persistence of interest, a stubborn singularity of focus, and a fascination with 
innovations in information and communication technologies. I was introduced to these 
technologies by a telecommunication engineer.  In his retirement, one of his missions was to 
impart to me his knowledge about technical specifications, about how and why some 
technologies and services had been invented and then forgotten, and why others had found 
favour with suppliers and users.  Richard Gabel is no ordinary engineer.  He is extremely 
well-versed in the politics and economics of the North American communication systems 
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which he helped to build.  I did not know in the 1970s, that the cables that we climbed into 
muddy trenches to touch, the wires and microwave towers, and digital information would 
come to be acknowledged as such a significant foundation for our economies.  
 
Canadians like myself find it easy to accept that information and communication systems are 
pivotal to our social and economic lives. This notion is deeply embedded in our cultures, our 
geography, our intellectual traditions which focus on the importance of space, time and the 
media,3 and much of our experience of nation building. Before my arrival on the academic 
scene, Marshall McLuhan, another Canadian, had claimed that ‘electronic interdependence 
recreates the world in the image of a global village’,4 a phrase many of you may have heard. 
Vigorous debate about this rhetorical assertion created a formative intellectual environment 
for me.  But my curiosity about the relationship between technological change, institutions of 
governance, and people’s lives was irrevocably provoked by three other people.  
 
Hilda Himmelweit was Professor of Social Psychology at the London School of Economics.  
She was the first to conduct empirical studies of social practices and perceptions of the media 
after television was introduced in Britain.5  She emphasised, always, the importance of 
rigorous empirical research.  She was fascinated by how media use was being accompanied 
by the formation of new social relationships and new kinds of active engagement.  She was 
also, incidentally, the first woman academic whom I encountered as my own lecturer. When I 
studied for my degree at the LSE in the mid-1970s, Hilda was also interested in institutions of 
governance and how regulations influence the way new technologies develop. Around this 
time too, I read some of Chris Freeman’s work and that of several others in SPRU.6  When I 
was returning to Canada, Hilda insisted that I track down two people she had encountered.  
Both, she said, were economists, but she suggested I ignore this fault and pursue my studies 
with them anyway.  
 
And so I did. One was a Canadian political economist.  Dallas Smythe dedicated his life to a 
combination of scholarly work and political activism.7  The other was William Melody who 
was immersed in research on the economics of the information and communication industry 
and the role of regulation.8  He had a Machiavellian belief in the power of social science 
research as a foundation for policy change - more than 20 years on I think he continues to 
believe this.  Both argued, in their different ways, that the power relationships that permeate 
the economy and the design and use of technologies affect our economies and social worlds 
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in crucial ways.  Both held that technological systems are not neutral. The principal questions 
for students of scientific and technological change must therefore be about asymmetries in 
economic and political relationships and institutional structures, and about how these 
asymmetries of power may be reduced or exacerbated through the use of the new 
technologies. 
 
I had begun my studies in cognitive and clinical psychology. Imagine the shock waves to my 
intellectual system.  I had first jumped across what I thought was a very wide chasm into 
social psychology.  Now here I was, confronted by two economists who argued that 
institutional structure and power relationships were all there was!!  Where were the people in 
their analysis?  Where were their hopes, their fears, and their capacities for action?  Initially, I 
could see no common cause.  But I did have a hunch.  If the disciplinary walls between social 
theory, economics and engineering could be breached, we might produce a better analysis of 
how changes in technologies, institutions of governance and the economy, affect human 
welfare.  And so I suggest to you that interdisciplinary training and research offer one 
important means of breaching the wall between our in front of the wall digital appliances and 
the behind the wall systems.  This is a formidable task and it is becoming more difficult as 
these technologies mature and become more complicated.  But it is worth the effort.  This 
kind of interdisciplinary research yields insights into policy options and actions that help us 
to imagine new ways of governing technological change.  It also helps us to see how we may 
come to be in a stronger position to modify the way the new digital technologies and 
information affect our lives.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
Now let me return to my digital wall.  How do we go about breaching this wall?  Secondly, 
are there some breaches that it is particularly important to widen?  There are, and I am going 
to talk about three of these.  Finally, I am going to illustrate some of the implications of all 
this for policy and governance.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
First, what is involved in breaching the digital wall?  Attempts to breach the wall between the 
technology designers and the users of the new digital appliances encounter an emotional 
battleground.  In front of the wall, the emotions of fear, scepticism and loathing fuel a 
dystopian vision.  Believers in this vision cite evidence of system breakdowns such as 
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software crashes that shut down airports, delay product shipments, and cause the London 
emergency services to go into grid-lock. They will offer you visions of ‘out of control’ global 
financial systems and intrusive surveillance of people at work and on the motorway.  They 
will raise alarms about the growth of personal isolation produced by hours of working with a 
PC and concerns about the way the media fans the fires of ethnic terrorism.  Supporters of 
this view may argue that people are disempowered by the new technologies or they may say 
that these outcomes arise from stupidity, avarice, or fanaticism. They worry about growing 
information poverty and information overload, and increasing divides between those who are 
affected in this way, and a smaller number of others who for one reason or another are not. 
They fear that the new digital technologies are too powerful for the ordinary user. 
 
Another view is utopian, or at least allows that the new technological tools can be used to 
benefit, perhaps not everyone, but certainly a growing number of people. Instead of systems 
breakdowns, proponents of this view will tell you about globally dispersed production 
facilities creating employment for people in industrialised countries and the entrepreneurial 
corners of developing countries.  They will produce evidence of streamlined supply chains 
and major reductions in the costs of services and manufactured goods. They will show you 
opportunities for greater inclusion of the poor through distance learning and improved health 
care delivered using telecommunication networks.  They will demonstrate how information 
technologies are being used to monitor pollution and to help speed up responses to natural 
disasters and to other forms of human suffering. They forecast big breakthroughs such as the 
ability to simulate the entire biosphere, in short, to compute the ‘uncomputable’, thereby 
providing a stronger evidence base for policies aimed at, for instance, maintaining 
biodiversity.9   
 
These beliefs are shared by optimists located behind and in front of the digital wall.  Some 
have even greater hopes for the future as people band together to form what we call ‘virtual 
communities’. They expect that the ‘virtual’ will become indistinguishable from the ‘real’.  
They foresee that many people’s needs for caring relationships will be met in the electronic 
Chat Rooms and through intimate email exchanges.  
 
These two viewpoints - the dystopian and the utopian - co-exist today just as they have for 
centuries.  Breaching the digital wall does not require that we resolve the controversies 
between those who hold markedly different beliefs about the new technologies. It does 
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require that we observe the developments in technologies and in our capabilities for 
governing and using them.   
 
Breaching the digital wall means inquiring into the important connections between what goes 
on behind the wall and in front of it.  This is essential if we want to maximise the positive 
outcomes of technology development and use.  Proponents of the chaotic systems habit of 
thought which I described earlier will claim that no government can, or should, attempt to 
fiddle with the course of technological development.  They will deny that there are any 
particular directions or biases worth thinking about as a result of the connections between 
what goes on behind the wall and the world in front of it.  
 
I contend that we can breach the wall and act upon what we learn about the significance of 
our interactions between the in front and behind the wall information and communication 
systems. As researchers, we have the opportunity to set ourselves the task of widening the 
breaches and ensuring that the results of our work contribute to a more pervasive habit of 
thought.  We must presume that technological change involves an examination of alternatives 
and that governance regimes are influencing the path of technology development. 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
What breaches in the digital wall are worth widening?  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
The first is an existing breach.  It involves building a ‘digital culture’.  It is based on the 
cultural wellsprings that nourish developments on both sides of the wall.  The second is an 
emerging breach.  It involves the members of virtual communities who are reproducing and 
extending important social networks.  The third is an embryonic breach.  This one involves 
developing new forms of regulation and governance to support the ‘electronic’ high streets 
and workplaces where people will shop and labour in the coming years. 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
First, building a digital culture.  Is there a digital culture and, if there is, where does it come 
from?  Those of us over the age of 40 will remember the Atomic Age where dreams of 
electrical power, too cheap to meter, alternated with the nightmare of nuclear annihilation.  
Atomic Age technologies were contained in vast sealed facilities tended by acolytes behind 
the wall.  A breach in this wall occurred when Three Mile Island and Chernobyl showed that 
the dream could become a nightmare.  To many it appeared that another of the Atomic Age 
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technologies, the computer, might follow a similar path.  A sombre prospect in view of the 
thousands of nuclear weapons whose launch is controlled by computer systems.  This threat 
has not disappeared, but the personal computer, a child of the 70s, has proven to be subject to 
domestication.10 
 
The personal computer liberated the technology, transforming it into the information 
appliances in front of the wall that Dr. Taylor now talks about.  The Atomic Age visions of 
centralised control and power gave way to dreams of stardom in cyberspace. Andy Warhol’s 
premise that everyone can be ‘famous for 15 minutes’ has become the aspiration of many 
young men and a very few young women. Sherry Turkle and other analysts of digital culture 
have observed that the fascination with control and power that computers provide is 
particularly seductive to young men who have little chance of following the career path of 
Mick Jagger, for instance. 11  Michael Benedikt, president of an American software design 
company, suggests that ‘cyberspace is the electronic equivalent of the imagined spiritual 
realms of religion’.12  David Noble, an historian of technology, thinks that enthusiasm for the 
Internet and virtual experiences may fulfil a need ‘to dwell empowered or enlightened on 
other, mythic, planes’.13  How do we build a digital culture that is not as polarised as this?  
 
In this country, women’s participation in higher education courses on computer technology 
and engineering has collapsed just as their average performance in A level subjects has begun 
to outstrip that of their male counterparts.  This is cause for action.  But breaching this wall, 
which influences how a digital culture is formed, requires probing analysis of the social 
authenticity of the digital culture that is being constructed.  What is needed for little girls and 
young women to aspire to a place at the control consoles behind the technology wall?   
 
We can take a lesson here from Martin Buber, the philosopher, theologian and psychologist 
who observed that ‘in the beginning is the relation[ship]’.14  He was interested in how our 
experiences and culture are mediated by ‘dialogue’.  Participants in dialogues - even those 
mediated by services like electronic mail -  establish relationships between themselves.  
There is research that looks at these changing relationships which motivate working and 
playing in virtual places and at how these are modified through interaction with behind the 
wall and in front of the wall technology systems.15  To understand why women and some 
other social groups are largely absent from these dialogues we need to question the designs of 
human-machine interfaces and the cognitive tools that systems designers assume exist for 
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using them.  The Internet’s design, both behind and in front of the wall, is influencing which 
relationships we choose to develop socially and for commercial gain, whether these 
relationships are satisfying or turbulent, and how they fit into the rest of our daily activities.  
Any substantial effort to redress the imbalances in the emerging digital culture will require 
much more penetrating research than has been produced thus far.  Redress will involve 
promoting the heroines, as well as the heroes of digital culture, and it will mean fostering 
ever-broader participation in that culture.  This will require a focus on two areas that are 
important in expanding this breach in the digital wall.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
The first is capabilities.  The absence of appropriate capabilities and skills makes us passive 
consumers of technologies.  We should be asking our schools and our governments what they 
are doing to promote the acquisition of capabilities to build a more equitable digital culture in 
the future. So far, much of what we hear is empty rhetoric.  The second is diversity.  Diversity 
is not only about reducing gender inequalities that stem from our collective failure to find 
ways of encouraging broader participation in cyberspace.  It is also about identifying 
problems and taking action to alleviate those types of social exclusion that can be 
compounded by certain developments in technologies for generating information and 
facilitating communication.  Some of the new applications, appliances and systems exclude 
through their very design.  Issues involving capabilities and diversity are crucial because they 
are tightly interwoven with new divides between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ of this world. 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
We must redress the dearth of appropriate capabilities and skills as well as the biases in 
technological design which exclude.  To do this, we must take action that will widen a second 
breach in the digital wall.  This can be achieved by building virtual community activities that 
are not exclusively oriented towards commercial gain.  People who are engaged in activities 
behind the wall form their own virtual communities.  Virtual communities attract people with 
common interests who engage in voluntary association using the Internet and other 
technologies.  These include the hacker culture, the open software movement, and a vast 
social network that reinforces their control of change.  These members of communities are 
distributing messages, sharing their knowledge, and offering mutual support and co-operation 
for scientific and other purposes.  These activities have great value for a vast spectrum of 
other social and economic activities.  We need a much better understanding of how these 
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communities can be initiated, nurtured, and extended.  This will require that we rethink how 
individual contributions to knowledge are valued.  For instance, in scientific research we 
need to give credit to those who produce information and to those who distribute it.  We need 
to develop new public information resources that foster better research.  In the education 
field, for example, we need to value those who create and those who distribute the 
information for distance education.   
 
If we can increase our successes in these areas, we will create constituencies of people with 
political interests and the capabilities to engage in a dialogue with those behind the digital 
wall. By encouraging the members of these virtual communities, each with their own needs 
and uses of the new technologies, we will be widening this emerging breach in the wall.  We 
will have opportunities for building a foundation for increasing the variety of ways of valuing 
those who produce new information and knowledge, beyond those which focus only on 
commodities and profit.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
Let me turn to the third embryonic way of breaching the wall, new forms of regulation and 
governance.  We need to examine what kinds of governance are needed to promote the 
acquisition of new capabilities, and to induce the degree of technological diversity that may 
help to forge a more cohesive world order.  Such governance may be in the form of 
government legislation and regulation or industry self-regulation.  
 
MIT’s Technology Review proclaims that ‘thanks to databases and the Internet, the ability to 
share immense amounts of data has grown rapidly … cutting edge collaborations bring with 
them new features: … the involvement of a broad geographical mix that includes participants 
from developing countries’.16  But the situation looks rather different from Africa.  
Participants in a recent UN Africa Development Forum suggested, in contrast, that 
competition will prevail over co-operation and information sharing as the Internet becomes 
more widely accessible.17  A European Commission report confirms this view on the basis of 
empirical evidence.  And I quote, ‘hardly any laboratory in the developing world has Web 
access to the important databases, which means that scientists working in these laboratories 
can never be equal partners in the world-wide enterprise of knowledge production’.18  
Asymmetries between the knowledge bases in many African countries and the wealthy 
countries will not decrease unless steps are taken to ease the costs of access and to build new 
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capabilities for participating in cyberspace.  
 
Asymmetries in information access and sharing are not confined to the developing countries.  
The growth of networking using the Internet is one factor among many that are contributing 
to recognition of the interdependence of the components of the global economy.  Our 
regulations and governance systems establish a context for the design of the systems behind 
and in front of the wall, and for the way they interact.  These interactions can give rise  
to many kinds of asymmetrical outcomes in the distribution of the benefits of the new 
technological tools.  
 
For example, current legislation encourages the efforts of Internet Service Providers to 
develop new technological means of collecting royalties for distributing or using scientific 
information, often funded by the public purse; it provides far fewer incentives for innovative 
communities who seek to share their information as ‘gifts’.  Current legislation seeks to 
protect digital information about you and your personal life, but it does not address what the 
computerised systems behind the wall are able to do with information that may jeopardise 
your privacy and which does not name you specifically.  The interactions behind and in front 
of the digital wall may protect the commercial security of information, yet computer hackers 
get through to attack public information services, banks and national security services. 
 
Explicit regulatory decisions and governance institutions are needed to enable the electronic 
high streets and workplaces to operate in ways that promote information sharing as well as 
commercial gain and competition, and in ways that protect individual privacy as well as 
permitting acceptable uses of digital information for profit and for national security.  By 
pursuing a habit of thought that presumes the interactions of technologies and legislation are 
not neutral in their effects, we encourage investigations of important issues.  For example, we 
are encouraged to examine how the determination of technical standards to achieve 
compatibility between different networks affects the information that you may access. It 
encourages us to assess how continuing efforts to strengthen the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights in digital information creates disincentives for cultural exchanges and the 
sharing of scientific and technical information.   
 
In the commercial realm of electronic commerce and in the face of the furious pace of growth 
of .com companies, we also need to examine how the legislative environment influences the 
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structure of the market and its players.  Probing into how commercial trading regulations 
affect the flows of capital that give rise to the new companies and their services yields 
insights into their motivations for developments behind the wall.  
 
For example, the fact that the technological system behind the wall rests in the hands of 
AOL-Time Warner, a company that has been inundating us with adverts recently to join 
millions of Internet users, is not an issue for those who pursue the chaotic systems habit of 
thought.  After all, as another contributor to MIT’s Technology Review argues, the Internet is 
a global, open system that anyone can access if they have the proper hardware, software and a 
minimum level of skill.  In front of the wall we can order books, music, insurance or travel 
tickets without leaving our offices or homes.  But a behind the wall investigation reveals that 
this is not the complete story.  
 
Corporate interests in open systems can change when the financial markets and the regulatory 
environments are conducive. Before the recent AOL-Time Warner merger, AOL was a very 
strong advocate of government intervention to maintain open access to the Internet.  It 
wanted the US government to force the owners of cable and telecommunication networks to 
open them so that AOL could access their customers.  AOL said policies and regulations 
were needed to ensure open access to the networks behind the wall.  Immediately after the 
merger, the new company said that government intervention is wrong.  The chaos of the 
‘free’ market should dictate who can access the new Information Age networks.  What 
changed?  The merged company now has a dominant share of the cable television subscribers 
in the United States. It now wants to ensure that no competitor disrupts its access to all these 
customers.19 The rhetoric of free markets and the jargon about the natural evolution of 
Internet services are being used to advance very specific financial interests with a goal of 
reducing variety, not of extending the options available to us.20 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
Developments in these areas are all outcomes of public or private sector deliberations and 
dialogues.  These dialogues and their outcomes result in selections from competing 
technological systems.  When we acknowledge this, we can work at understanding how the 
accumulation of these choices affects what we can do in front of the digital wall.  We can 
work on comprehending what interests are enabling the behind the wall systems to function 
in ways that are more or less beneficial to us.  This habit of thought is consistent with 
widening the embryonic breach in the digital wall.  The results of investigations of the 
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developments I have touched upon enable us to imagine new forms of governance that are 
consistent with encouraging new capabilities and diversity in our experience of the new 
dimensions of cyberspace.  
 
The claims of the visionaries, the optimists and the pessimists, need to be investigated.  We 
can widen these breaches in the digital wall - by building a digital culture, by encouraging the 
members of virtual communities, and by providing a better understanding of the interactions 
between technological innovation and our governance system.  It is by widening these 
breaches that we will create a basis for dialogue between those people who are operating 
behind the digital wall and those of us who are affected by their choices.  Policy action is 
needed to broaden participation in that dialogue.  This can be achieved by encouraging new 
capabilities and by embracing diversity in our schools and other social institutions.  It can be 
achieved by creating stronger incentives for generating variety and higher levels of 
competence in virtual communities.  And it may be accomplished by developing a better 
evidence base for considering how regulation and governance interacts with technological 
change.  Failure to meet these opportunities for breaching the digital wall means resigning 
our future to chance, and perhaps to chaos. 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
Now to conclude.  Heidegger wrote about ‘unconcealment’ as the process of deepest 
inqury.21 Deep inquiry is needed if we are to ‘unconceal’ the choices and interests that are 
contributing to the shape of the technological system behind and in front of the wall.  A 
principal aim of policy-relevant social science is to illuminate that which may be obscured by 
common habits of thought.  A dialogue between the sceptics and enthusiasts of the 
Information Age is essential.  Without a dialogue that ‘unconceals’, some people will receive 
extraordinary benefits from the development of the new information and communication 
technologies.  They will feel comfortable with, and even welcome, the changes that these 
technologies bring to their lives.  Other people will be excluded.  For some this will be due to 
temperament, belief, or simply preference.  But others will be excluded because of economic 
and social inequalities that will not be resolved simply by assuming that the trajectory of 
change is neutral and chaotic.  
 
Widening the breaches in the wall calls for each of us to ask questions about our participation 
in the Information Age.  Do I feel included in some part of the digital culture and am I 
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acquiring capabilities that will support my inclusion?  How can I benefit, and see that others 
benefit, from participating in and supporting one or more virtual communities?  Do I 
understand that public decisions are affecting whether I can modify the information 
appliances and behind the wall systems that are changing my life and the lives of future 
generations? 
 
I hope I have convinced you that it is possible to mould the emerging knowledge-based 
societies.  I hope I have not made you think that science and technology policy research is 
simply about breaching the real walls that you have been watching on the screen - behind me 
[the lecture was accompanied by a montage of images representing breaches in the wall].  
Widening some of these breaches will require specialised capabilities and skills that only a 
very few of us will acquire. But building digital cultures, supporting virtual communities, and  
creating incentives for public, as well as for commercial, endeavour in cyberspace is a very 
much more inclusive agenda.  
 
Thank you! 
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